Blame Game: Oil Refinery Explosions and Fires

Sensationalistic journalism reaches new heights in the blame game following the catastrophic vapor cloud flash fire and explosion at the Tesoro Anacortes Refinery that occurred early Friday morning. From information in a Swiss Re internal report obtained by Associated Press the article headlines that US oil refineries are more unsafe than other global refineries.

This is a false presumption especially when there is no indication that US refineries are experiencing more fatalities and injuries than the over 500 other global oil refineries. The bottom line in workplace safety is preventing fatalities and injuries and has nothing to do with economic losses per amount of oil refined. Just what economic losses is the Swiss Re internal report referring to? Would that be down-time from a refinery turnaround during regular maintenance? Where is the information concerning fatalities per 100, 000 full-time equivalent workers instead of the vagaries of economic losses?

Swiss Re Report
A questionable aspect in minimizing losses in the refining industry is why the Chemical Safety Board did not share this information with American stakeholders when CSB obtained this report two years earlier from Swiss Re? If there is vital information in the Swiss Re report that could have provided a better understanding of the prevalence of refinery incidents, then why did CSB not reveal this information two years ago? Waiting for another accident to happen serves no understandable purpose and is very troubling when a governmental agency that is tasked in protecting the workplace fails in providing transparency in the complexity of the issue.

To further enhance the knee jerk reaction following the recent Tesoro incident, Chemical Safety Board Chairman, John Bresland was quoted in the AP news article,” If the aviation industry were having the same number of significant serious accidents as the refinery industry was having you probably wouldn't see people flying too much," This is an absurd remark, like comparing apples and oranges. Since when is traveling onboard commercial airlines equivalent to working in Hazardous Class I locations with potentially explosive atmospheres?

Airline Accidents
A troubling aspect in CSB Chairman Bresland's remark is that it is inaccurate. For example, according to Flight International’s research, in 2009 there were 28 fatal airline accidents with 749 fatalities in the global airline industry. In contrast, in 2008 there were 34 fatal airline accidents and 583 fatalities. So have travelers stopped flying or have there been more oil refinery fatalities than airline fatalities? The facts prove not so.

Preventing and mitigating future fatalities and injuries in the oil refining sector requires understanding the complexities of operating in potentially explosive atmospheres. Like a policeman or a fireman that goes to work everyday, these professionals know the hazards and understand they might not return. It’s the same in the oil refining industry when operators return to work, yet an unspoken topic amongst co-workers. After-all we are not baking cookies.

Class I Hazardous Locations
The flammable liquids, vapors, and gases that refinery operators work with in 7/24 oil movement operations during 12-16 hour shifts also pose an inherent risk. It takes less than a millijoule of minimum ignition energy to ignite these flammable and explosive refined products. At times in your home, while walking across the carpet accumulating an electrical charge and then touching the door knob discharges approximately 20 millijoules of energy in the electrostatic discharge. This is approximately 90 times more energy required to ignite naphtha vapors with a flash point of 112 °F (44°C). Occasional gasoline vapor cloud flash fires, with similar ignition sensitivities as naphtha, occur at gas stations while customers are filling gas containers or their vehicle that have been ignited with electrostatic discharge.

Flash fires do occasionally happen at oil refineries but at a much larger scale than at the local gas station. Especially when there is the multitude of process situations and conditions in addition to static electricity. The probability of occurrence and severity of consequence can be minimized through appropriate best engineering practices, administrative controls, and personnel protective equipment. Management and employees all do their best to minimize the probability of a flash fire or explosion, as everyone desires to go home to their families at the end of the shift. Yet too 100% totally prevent any incidents would require a total shutdown of the refineries.

Hydrotreater Fires
So the oil refineries continue to operate in providing economic security for the nation while fires also continue to occur at these facilities. For instance, according to media accounts in the past three years there has been over half a dozen fires at other oil refinery hydrotreater (hydrodesulfurization) units like the one at Tesoro. This doesn't include the many fires that were not reported by the media. Fortunately the severity of consequence has been minimal in the past few years, yet the probability of occurrence is high with the history of many global oil refinery hydrotreater fires.

Now all of a sudden with the Tesoro catastrophe, severity of consequence is high where utmost attention to detail is warranted. Were the abundance of other prior hydrotreater fires throughout industry with no fatalities a warning salvo that no one heard? For instance, in May 2006 a hydrotreater fire/explosion at Valero Refinery in St. Charles, Louisiana was assessed by CSB and concluded that no additional investigation was necessary,

Conclusion
Why does it take a mass causality rate before anyone's attention is startled? That is the problem with our present occupational health and safety framework with lawmakers and regulators waiting for horrific accidents to happen and using fatality statistics as the primary basis in taking action. What about the global industry precursors to these tragedies?

To conclude that all American oil refineries were operating unsafely due to the hydrotreater fires would be inaccurate. The nature of the refining operation continually presents a potential fire hazard with the high pressures and temperatures involved in removing impurities from the feedstock. Occupational health and safety professionals do their best to prevent and mitigate such incidents. Yet like a car traveling on the highway, how do we prevent the next flat tire from occurring?

Resources
Hydrotreating Unit Oil & Gas Journal
Hydrotreating Refinery Fires Combustible Dust Policy Institute
Airline Fatalities -FlightGlobal
Refineries Bad Safety Record The Seattle Times-AP Article